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EXHIBIT "A"

EXHIBIT "B"

Description of Property in Plaintiffs'
Complaint for the purpose of Quieting Title

PARCEL 1
Beginning at a point which is North 53.21 feet and East 202.62 feet
from the North quarter corner of Section 8, Township 2 South,
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, said point being in the
center of Big Cottonwood Creek; thence South 25.97 feet; thence
S 70° W 112.86 feet; thence N 58°40' E 124.16 feet to the point
of beginning. Containing 0.032 Acre (1377 square feet).

PARCEL 2
Beginning at a point which is South 98.05 feet from the North
quarter corner of Section 8 Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, said point being in the center of Big
Cottonwood Creek; thence N 48°05' E along the center of said
creek a distance of 129.77 feet; thence S 26° W 224.40 feet;
thence N 86° W 132.00 feet; thence S 74° W 23.18 feet; thence
North 48.00 feet to the center of the beforementioned creek;
thence N 73°20' E 72.31 feet; thence N 63°20' E 96.79 feet to
the point of beginning. Containing 0.389 Acre (16,936 square feet)
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CHARLES He STRATFORD,
and ROBERT L. HARRIS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Case No. 18306

VS.

EARL P. MORGAN, EARL D.
MORGAN, GLORIA M. BROADBENT,
EVELYN M. NEVILLE and
ALICE M. TIMMERMAN,
Defendants-Respondents.:

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The defendants-respondents agree basically with the
plaintiffs-appellants' statement of the kind of case.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The respondents agree with the disposition of the lower
court, but hold that in addition, the said appellants failed to
meet the burden of proof and failed to establish any of the elements
of boundary line by acquiescence as required under the guidelines
of the previous decisions of the Utah Supreme Courto
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants seek to affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts as presented by the appellants,
needs further explanation.

When L. H. Stratford and Ella Stratford

purchased the property on March 10, 1951, only a small portion of
their land was bounded by Big Cottonwood Creek.

The drawing and

layout, as set forth on Exhibit "A" of Respondents' brief, fairly
illustrates and sets forth the area of dispute with particular
attention from the common points of beginning of appellants' and
respondents' land with the same north quarter corner, section 8,
Township 2· South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

At

the time of the purchase of the Stratford property in the spring
of 1951, the evidence is clear there was no partial fence in
existence along the south bank of Cottonwood Creek, but there was
an interior fence approximately 150 feet south of Cottonwood
stream on the south side of the creek and the said Morgans were
using it in relationship to their farm for a long period of time
prior to the purchase of the Stratfords.

What the Stratfords did

in 1951 was to remove the interior fence 150 feet South of Cottonwood Creek, which was in a state of disrepair and place a new
fence along the south bank of Cottonwood Creek and the defendants'
father, who had just lost his wife, and was in poor health, not
being able to defend himself, did not bring an action for the
removal of the Stratfords or their ejectment at that time.
From an examination of the record, pursuant to Exhibit
28, which is attached, the same north quarter corner of Section 8,
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Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian was
used to measure the boundary line between the plaintiffs' and
defendants' land.

It appears rather conclusively from the abstract,

Exhibit 28, and from its examination that from the time of the
patenting of the land to 1906 that Cottonwood Stream was wandering
or meandering some period of time, and the parties at that time
were attempting to measure their properties from the center of Big
Cottonwood Creek.

After 1906, no predecessor in title of either

the plaintiffs or the defendants, ever again used the center of
Big Cottonwood Creek for their metes and bounds description of the
property.

It might be well to point out that the parties did not

use "Big Cottonwood Creek as a measuring device, but used metes
and bounds and then described that as being in the center of
Cottonwood Creek." But after 1906 none of the parties ever mentioned
Big Cottonwood Creek in relationship to the surveys of their
property.

It appears that all of the parties were using metes

and bounds after 1906 and each one was occupying their property by
their metes and bounds description after that period of time.
On May 23, 1979, Charles Stratford had his property
surveyed and the land set forth from the North quarter corner
of Section 8, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian which indicates that his property line was 150 feet
South of Big Cottonwood Creek and that his predecessors' title,
as they had conveyed it to him from 1874, had located their
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boundary line approximately 150 feet south of Big Cottonwood
Creek.

In fact an examination of the record and the stipulations

by opposing counsel during the trial were as follows:
1.

That the said plaintiffs-appellants were not claiming

any land by the doctrine of adverse possession. (R. 123) This was
merely a confirmation of previous stipulations in court chambers
prior to the commencement of the trial.
2.

In the record, (R. 166) counsel for Stratfords, Mr.

West, stated to the court:

"MR. WEST: I would like to make a motion at this
time to amend the complaint to conform with the
evidence that has been presented in the case; and
amend the complaint to add an additional cause of
action based upon adverse possession. I think the
evidence shows that there has been possession of
this property since the year 1951. The evidence
also shows that the tax notice has come out with
the deed description on the tax notice; but the
acreages as shown on those tax notices is in
excess of what the deed description is, which to
me indicates that there have been taxes paid on
the entire parcel.
THE COURT: Excuse me, Mr. West. Do I understand the tax notices do not include the disputed
portion in their metes and bounds description?
MR. WEST:

That's correct."

The court then went on to say, in the record on page 174:
"THE COURT: Well, Mr. West, first to your motion
to include adverse possession I am going to deny
that because I specifically asked whether you were
asserting adverse possession and you indicated you
were not.
"Secondly, I think that with the description on the
tax notice it wouldn't be sufficient to constitute
adverse possession without describing the property
in question. It leaves it too ambiguous as to
whether the other portion of the acreage is.
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The court then ruled in effect that boundary line by acquiescence
had not been established by the plaintiffs because the boundary
line, by their own evidence, was not in doubt, had never been in
dispute and there was no conflict in reference to the same.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS DID NOT ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE
OF BOUNDARY LINE BY ACQUIESCENCE AND THE COURT
PROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT
We do not dispute the basic facts as set forth in
Baum vs. Defa, 525 P.2d 725, (Utah 1974), Fuoco vs. Williams,
421 P.2d 944, (Utah 1966), which states as follows:
"In former opinions this court has required four
prerequesites to establish a presumption of
boundary by acquiescence. They are: (1) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments,
fences or buildings, (2) mutual acquiescence in
the line as the boundary, (3) for a long period
of years, (4) by adjoining landowners.''
The first case to deal with this problem is Brown v.
Milliner, 232 P.2d 202 (Utah 1951), where the court stated as
follows:
"A review of the Utah cases involving boundary
disputes reveals that it has long been recognized in
this state that when the location of the true
boundary between two adjoining tracts of land is
unknown, uncertain or in dispute, the owners thereof
may, by parol agreement, establish the boundary
line and thereby irrevocably bind themselves and
their grantees.
. . . In the latter case this court·
pointed out that when the location of the true boundar is known to the ad"oinin owners an
arol a reement between them establishing the boun ary e sewhere would be an attempt to transfer an interest
realty without complying with the statute of frauds.
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But, we stated, if the location of the true boundary
is not known to the adjoining owners, a parol agreement between them fixing its location is not regarded
as transferring an interest in land but merely determining the location of existing estates. (emphasis
added)
"We have further held in this state that in the
absence of evidence that the owners of adjoining
property or their predecessors in interest ever
expressly agreed as to the location of the boundary between them, if they have occupied their
respective premises up to an open boundary line
visibly marked by monuments, fences or bui~dings
for a long period of time and mutually recognized
it as the dividing line between them, the law will
imply an agreement fixing the boundary as located,
if it can do so consistently with the facts
appearing, and will not permit the parties nor
their grantees to depart from such lineo"
The final later pronouncement of this court is in the case
of John Joseph Madsen vs. Darrell L. Clegg, 639 P.2d 726, Utah
(1981), with facts identically the same as in this case.

The

Supreme Court stated:
"The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has long
been recognized, and when the location of the true
boundary between adjoining tracts of land is unknown, uncertain or in dis ute, the owners thereof
may, y para agreement, estab is the boundary
line and thereby irrevocably bind themselves and
their grantees. However, when the true boundary
is known, an
arol a reement of the owners establis in the boundar elsewhere is void and unen orceable b virtue o the
o frauds, which
requires a conveyance o
property to be in writing.
"This court has determined that in the absence of
an express agreement as to the location of the boundary
between adjoining owners, the law will imply an
agreement fixing the boundary as located, if it can do
so consistently with the facts appearing. However,
when the evidence fails to support any implication
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that a fence has been erected by adjoining owners pursuant to an agreement between them as to the location
of the boundary between them, the doctrine of boundary
by acquiescence has no application. In an earlier
case, this court cautioned:
"'We do not wish to be understood as holding
that the parties may not claim to the true
boundary, where an assumed or agreed boundary
is located through mistake or inadvertance,
or where it is clear that the line as located
was not intended as a boundary, and where a
boundary so located has not been acquiesced
in for a long term of years by the parties
in interest. [emphasis added.]'
In the instant case, plaintiff showed that no uncertainty or dispute existed concerning the location of
boundary line at the time the 1904 fence was constructed. The 1904 deeds to plaintiff's and defendant's predecessors unmistakably define a boundary
which takes a substantial job northward at its
eastern end. Defendant has raised no question con~
cerning the validity of these deeds; nor has he shown
any subsequent conveyance by plaintiff or his father
which might cast doubt on plaintiff's present title.
The trial court did not include in its findings any
indication that the boundary was disputed when
plaintiff's father built the fence or that the
fence was intended originally as a boundary line.
In the absence of any initial uncertainty concerning
the ownership of the property in question, the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has no application."
From the application of the Madsen v. Clegg, supra,
above, the following identical facts and circumstances are very
apparent in this case as to the plaintiffs and defendants:
1.

There is no question as to the validity of any

deeds of the plaintiff or the defendants or their predecessors in
title.
2.

There was no question as to validity of the survey

or surveys or the metes and bounds descriptions of the respective
plaintiffs' and defendants' land from the north quarter corner,
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Section 8, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.

Counsel for plaintiffs stipulated in open court (R.

169):
"THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this, sir; and it
may be it's in evidence, I don't know. If you look
at the Morgan description on the south side of the
Morgan description and the north part of the Stratford
descriptions, metes and bounds descriptions on the
respective deeds, do they coincide?
"MR. WEST: It's my understanding that the descriptions
do in fact coincide."
3.

There is no evidence of any agreement between the

Stratfords and the Morgans, Mrs. L .. H. Stratford, plaintiff, as
grantee in the original deed, never did claim any such agreement
and neither did her son.
4.

There are no subsequent conveyances by either the

Morgans or the Stratfords, which might cast doubt on the plaintiffs'
present title.
5.

There is no evidence that the plaintiffs' father

ever built the fence with the intention that it be a boundary
line, or the defendants' father ever agreed that it was to be the
boundary line.
6.

There was no evidence in the record that the own-

ership of either the plaintiffs' property or the defendants' property or any of their predecessors in title as to ownership was
ever in doubt, uncertain or in dispute.
7.

There is no evidence of any payment of taxes by

the plaintiffs and as the court pointed out, the description on the
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tax notice would not be sufficient to constitute adverse possession
without describing the property in question (R. 174).
8.

Prior to the purchase of the property by the

Stratfords in 1951, the Morgans had used it as a pasture and
planted it to grass and other forage
(R.159).

crops for their cattle

From sunnnary of all of the cases that have been decided

by the Supreme Court in this area, which are as follows:
Baum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725, (Utah 1974)
Wright v. Clissold, 521 P.2d 1224 (Utah, 1974)
Fuoco v. Williams, 421 P.2d 944 (Utah, 1966)
Motzkus v. Carroll, 322 P.2d 391 (Utah 1958)
Anderson Vo Osguthorpe, 504 P.2d 1000 (Utah, 1972)
Holmes v. Judge 87P. 809 (1906)
Peterson v. Johnson, 34 P.2d 697 (Utah 1934)
Can be sunnnarized as to certain basic facts in reference to the
application of Boundary Line by Acquiescence, that where the true
boundary line is known, any parole agreement establishing the
boundary elsewhere is void and unenforceable by the statute of
frauds which requires the conveyance of real property to be in
writing, see also Madsen v. Clegg, supra.
9.

That from a long period of time of usage, the court

will imply an agreement between the owners, but where the evidence
fails to support any implication that the fence has been erected
by joining landowners pursuant to an agreement, the doctrine of
Boundary Line by Acquiescence has no

applica~ion.

In this case

the trial court by stipulation between counsel and opponents, determined that the boundary line between the parties was not in dispute.
There was no agreement between the property owners as to the
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location of a boundary line and there was no evidence to support
an implication that the fence had been erected by the adjoining
landowners pursuant to agreement.

Therefore, based upon the

evidence introduced by the plaintiff himself in support of his
Complaint to quiet title, it utterly failed from the facts of his
own presentation.

There was no need for the defendants to proceed

because it would have only corroborated the plaintiffs' own
testimony and his own witnesses as to the facts and circumstances,
as to the conclusion there was basically no dispute as to the
boundary line.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN SUSTAINING AN
OBJECTION TO THE PLAINTIFFS' PROFERRED EVIDENCE.
The Title Opinion.

During the course of the trial, the

defendant attempted to introduce a title opinion in 1951, by
Stephens, Brayton & Lowe concerning some early conveyances which
tied the north boundary of the property to Big Cottonwood Creek.
Of course, this was merely an attorney's opinion, which in no way
could be binding upon the defendants and was not in any way
offered as an exception to the hearsay rule and was clearly within
Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence, which states as follows:
"Evidence of
by a witness
to prove the
evidence and

a statement which is made other than
while testifying at the hearing offered
truth of the matter stated is hearsay
inadmissible, except:"

Also the letter states:

"Most of the early conveyances

tie the North boundary to the center of Cottonwood Creek."
goes on to say:
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It

"The last deed referring to the Cottonwood Creek
as a boundary is dated in 1906."
The problem here is that somehow the plaintiffs are claiming the
center of Big Cottonwood Creek is the boundary line, by the Stephens,
Brayton & Lowe attorneys' opinion, but his boundary line by acquiescence is a fence on the south side of Big Cottonwood Creek.

This

is confusing and is a claim for two different boundary lines.
Again, it cannot be stressed too clearly that an examination of the plaintiffs' abstract (Ex. 28) on page 11 of Orson
Sanders to Asa D. Reynolds, on November 12, 1906, which is the
last time Cottonwood Creek was ever mentioned, does not mention
the boundary line as being Cottonwood Creek, but gives metes and
bounds and then mentions one of the calls as being in the "center
of Big Cottonwood Creek."

Again, not to be too repetitious,

Big

Cottonwood Creek was never used as a boundary line as such, but
was mentioned in some of the calls as being the location line of
the metes and bounds descriptions.
Also,. at best there is no evidence that Mr. Morgan ever
had any knowledge as to the same, that this was brought to his
attention, or that any claim was ever made or that this was an
area of dispute and the whole opinion is based mostly on "You
state that the Creek bed has changed'' which is merely a selfserving statement by L. H. Stratford, which has no application in
this case and was without foundation.
Correspondence with Salt Lake County.

Again, the

correspondence with Salt Lake County was clearly within Rule 63,
Rules of Evidence, and was hearsay, self-serving, and
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immaterial.

There is no evidence that Salt Lake County ever

examined the title of the plaintiffs or defendants and that what
Salt Lake County's letter may have been on is other people's property two miles up the stream or two miles down the stream or what
others may have used, and based upon that without any further
evidence or foundation, the court very properly, on the basis of
(1) lack of foundation, (2) hearsay, and (3) self-serving.
The plaintiffs cite the case of Durfey v. Board of
Education df Wayne County, 604 P.2d 480 (Utah 1979) and Webb v.
Webb, 253 P.2d 372 (Utah 1949) and 29 Am Jur 2d, §497.

These

cases we state may very well be pertinent to show the mental state
of mind of a person, but there is no evidence here from any
assertions what the state of mind of L. H. Stratford was other
than deciding to appropriate defendants' land on his own, without
any basis of misunderstanding, or confusion in either his abstract,
his title, or his deeded conveyances.
Testimony from Mrs. Stratford.

Again, the objection as

to Ella Stratford's testimony, what she understood the boundary line
to be, at Big Cottonwood Creek, is hearsay, immaterial, without
foundation and a conclusion.

Without any of the basic approaches

of the introduction of the testimony, the court very properly did
not allow the evidence in on the basis as to plaintiffs as they
proposed their questions and as it related to the testimony of
this witness.
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POINT III
THE FORM OF THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WAS PROPER.
The Judgment of the court decreed that the plaintiffs
had no fee simple title in certain property described by metes and
bounds as set forth in the "plaintiffs' complaint". (Exhibit B)

An

analysis 9£ the plaintiffs' complaint (R. 2) requests the court to
quiet title in Charles H. Stratford and Robert L. Harris because
they were fee title owners to Parcels 1 and Parcel 2.

The Complaint

then states in paragraph 2, (R. 2) that the defendants claim an
interest.

Paragraph 3 (R. 3) states that they are claiming title

by virtue of acquiescence in the fence and stream and boundary
line.
It, therefore, appears that the basic allegations of the
plaintiffs' Complaint claims that they were the fee title owners
in Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 and by their own evidence they failed to
establish that they had any fee title or record title to Parcels 1
and 2.

The map of the property of which they seek to quiet title

is set forth as an exhibit to this Complaint, see illustration,
Exhibit "A", Description Exhibit "B".
The plaintiffs now claim that the decree caused a portion
of the property occupied by the plaintiffs to be transferred to
the defendants because defendants had no interest in the property.
This is merely a conclusion on their part.

They fail to realize

that in bringing a quiet title action that they must rely on the
strength of their title and not because of any weakness alleged in
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the defendants.

The pronouncement of this court in Olsen v. Park

Daughters Investment Company, 511 P.2d 145 (Utah 1973) states the
general law very clearly in this matter.
''In analyzing the plaintiffs' attack upon the findings
and judgment it is appropriate to have in mind these
basic propositions: In order for them to prevail,
plaintiffs had the burden of proof to establish their
case, and to persuade the trial court; and particularly in this action to quiet title, this had to be
done on the strength of their own title and not because of any weakness in that of the defendants."
Babcock v. Dangerfield, 98 Utah 10, 94 P.2d 862 (1939);
Mercur Coalition Mining Company v. Cannon, 112 Utah
13, 184 P.2d 341 (1947);
Smith v. DeNiro, 26 Utah 2d 153, 486 P.2d 1036 (1971)
The said defendants failed to prove that they had any record title
and failed to prove that they had title by boundary line by
acquiescence or any other title upon which to base their quiet
title action.

Therefore, the trial court's determination of the

form of the judgment is proper and is proper under the existing
law.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
TO AMEND THE PLEADINGS TO CONFORM WITH THE EVIDENCE.
The plaintiffs' allegations of error in Point IV are
very confusing and hard to comprehend under existing principles
of law.

They don't claim mistake, they don't claim inadvertance,

they don't claim surprise, they don't claim improper conduct on
the part of the judge.

They are somehow claiming that they mis-

read the existing case law as to boundary line by acquiescence
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and, therefore, based upon misunderstanding of ·the law of boundary
line by acquiescence they now want to proceed on a new theory,
having stated expressly to the court that that was not the basis
upon which they were proceeding, either by their complaint or by
their action on the day of the trial.
Upon reading the complaint (R. 2) they commenced an
action to quiet title alleging they were the fee simple title
owners of the disputed land, which they were plainly not.

They

did not claim that they had paid taxes, which would have been
required by adverse possession, or any other basis upon the land
which they were entitled to.
On page 123 of the record, the court plainly stated as

follows:
"THE COURT: I understand you are not claiming
adverse possession, only claiming boundary by
acquiescence?
MR. WEST: Claiming boundary by acquiescence.
I would offer plaintiffs' Exhibit 31."

And

It is not until the conclusion of the case that after everything
had taken place that the plaintiff then made a motion to amend
the complaint for adverse possession.
The court stated to Mr. West on page 174 of the record:
"THE COURT: Well, Mr. West, first to your motion
to include adverse possession I am going to deny
that because I specifically asked whether you were
asserting adverse possession and you indicated you were
not.
"Secondly, I think that with the description on
the tax notice it wouldn't be sufficient to con-
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stitute adverse possession without describing
the property in question. It leaves it too ambiguous as to whether the other portion of the acreage
is."
There is no evidence that the plaintiffs ever paid any
taxes on parcels 1 and 2 of which they requested the above entitled
court to quiet title in their names and an examination of the tax
notice very amply rules this.
It is very elementary, although the said plaintiffs
place some emphasis that the amount of land as shown on their tax
title is greater than the amount as it is described in their deed,
it is very clear that the land which they are claiming, now by
adverse possession, does not include the land which they seek to
quiet title on, parcels 1 and 2, but is included within the deeded
description of the defendants, for which they had been paying
taxes.
It is now argued, by the plaintiffs, that although it
was not offered in evidence, somehow if the amount of land described
by Salt Lake County Assessor's office, is greater than the actual
amount of land, as set forth in their deed, that

thi~

extends over

into defendants' land for which they have no title and for which
they have paid no taxes.

It is elementary that their tax notices

coincide exactly with their legal description.

They were paying

taxes on no more or on no greater parcel of land than by their
deeded tax description.

The probable reason of the difference in

their tax notice by quantity than their deeded description is
probably based upon the fact that the original deed was from the
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center of 4800 South.

It could also be a computer or surveyor
co~nty

mistake in computation in the office of the
Salt Lake County.

assessor of

There are more than a thousands reasons that

might explain this particular discrepancy.

It is again merely a

question of speculation.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the arguments and the authorities as cited
herein, it is respectfully urged that the judgment of the trial
court be affirmed.

It is also urged that the rulings on evidence

were true, .correct and proper and should also be affirmed by this
court.
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